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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the effects of social networks on income and employment dynamics of 
rural-urban migrants in Vietnam. Estimation of a causal effect is challenging because 
unobserved factors affects both employment performances and social networks. I address this 
endogeneity problem by using instrumental variable method. The results suggest that social 
networks improve migrant’s incomes and make wage earners willing to change their jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Social networks are considered an important informal mechanism through which information 
about job opportunities is transmitted. By solving information and commitment problems in 
environments where markets are inefficient, social networks bridge the informational gap 
between the worker and the firm by providing information on both sides, therefore reducing 
uncertainty and improving the match (Munshi, 2011). Social networks are even more 
important to migrants from rural to urban regions who found it difficult to adapt to new 
environment, are typically lack of information about the host labor market and the 
characteristics of the jobs offered.  
 
The significant role of social contacts in obtaining employment has long been recognized. 
However, what less understood is its possible effects on subsequent wages or the decision of 
workers to change their employment position by using such networks. While positive wage 
effects derived from social networks are reported by some studies, this is not universal. For 
instance, Delattre & Sabatier (2007) find that after correcting for selection bias on the wage 
equation, the effect of social network on wages is negative. One explanation is related to 
training costs (Pellizzari, 2010). Firms may want to spend extra effort to fill positions using 
formal rather than informal means when the posts require high training cost, which can result 
in high wages. A second explanation bases on the argument of job seekers’ impatience. Those 
keen to find employment quickly may use informal contacts, sacrificing potentially higher 
wages from better matched positions for quicker entry into work (Bentolila et al., 2010). 
Given the ambiguous theoretical predictions about the impact of using informal contacts on 
subsequent wages, it is worthwhile to test the hypothesis empirically. 
 
Empirical analyses on the effects of social networks also have been plagued by various 
conceptual and data problems. Many commonly used datasets lack information on the 
structure and composition of individuals’ social networks. Analyses are further complicated 
by various endogeneity issues such as the refection problem and selection bias. A reflection 
problem arises when migrants and network migrants’ outcomes are determined 
simultaneously, which inherently confounds the measure of the social network. Selection bias 
leads to a correlated unobservable problem when people tend to associate with others based in 
part on some unobserved group characteristics they favor. In such a case, an observed positive 
association between an individual’s outcome and those of their associated network members 
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may not be causal but rather due to some unknown factors that affect both social links and 
individual’s own labor market outcomes (see Munshi (2011) for a review). 
 
The literature seeks to control for as much as possible the individual characteristics and 
economic conditions that could be correlated with networks and individuals’ labor market 
outcomes. However, the obvious concern is that the unobserved variables remain unaccounted 
for. Observed individual characteristics such as age, education, and occupational experience 
may not capture traits such as initiative and diligence that play a critical role in determining 
the individual’s market outcomes. Empirical studies on the effect of networks on labor market 
outcomes, for example, often use the number of friends or relatives in cities to measure the 
strength of the individual’s network. If individuals with greater ability have a larger social 
networks also have better labor market outcomes, the relationship between networks and 
labor market outcomes could be driven by the unobserved ability effects. Studies using 
received help or the extent of social interaction to measure the network may suffer from 
potential selectivity bias, since we would expect more able individuals to receive more help or 
to be better connected and to do well in the labor market. Using fixed effects can fully capture 
constant unobservable individual characteristics which may affect both networks and labor 
market outcomes but may fail to account for unobserved factors that vary over time. 
 
This study seeks to improve our knowledge about the relationship between social networks 
and labor market outcomes of rural to urban migrants in Vietnam using a novel source of 
internal migration data. Vietnamese labor market institution is full of uncertainty and 
frictions. Hence, individuals rely heavily on informal channels to get better paid jobs. As far 
as I am aware, this study could be the first empirical analysis investigating the importance of 
social networks in shaping migrants’ income dynamics. 
 
To explore the research questions, I use a question from the Vietnam Rural Urban Migration 
Survey to derive a novel proxy for social networks: the number of phone call that migrants 
made during the Lunar New Year in urban areas. The analysis is carried out using linear 
regression models. I find that people who made more phone calls are also getting better paid 
jobs. In addition, wage earners with extensive social networks exhibit more willingness to 
change from wage earners to become self-employed. 
 
However, the positive correlations observed here may not be causal due to potential 
measurement errors or omitted variable problems discussed above. In order to address these 
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potential endogeneity, I use the historical weather disasters at rural sending regions as 
instruments for social networks. The inherent characteristics of weather disasters at the 
departure of migrants provide a basis for the instrument’s exogeneity. Weather disasters at 
rural sending regions would affect the expected agricultural output of the households exposed 
to it, and thereby impacts on migration decisions of members of rural households. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that weather disasters could impact on migrant’s income at the 
destination, other than through the social network. 
 
The results from the instrumental variable (IV) approach suggest that the social network helps 
to improve labour incomes and make migrants be willing to change their jobs. To confirm the 
findings from IV approach, I carry out some sensitivity tests on the validity of instrumental 
variable. To address the concern of whether the exclusion restriction is satisfied, I perform a 
falsification test that examines the reduced form relationship between weather disasters and 
incomes. The results confirm that social networks estimated by the IV approach have positive 
effects on income dynamics. 
  
I begin, in Section 2, by reviewing literature on the impact of social networks on incomes and 
describing the labor institutions faced by migrants in Vietnam. Section 3 documents the data 
used. The identification strategy employed is discussed in detail in section 4. It also reports 
the OLS estimates of the relationship between social networks and dynamics of income and 
employment. I then turn to the issues of causality OLS estimates that control for an extensive 
set of observable characteristics, as well as the IV estimates. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and institutional background 
 
2.1. Literature review 
 
There are numerous studies on the relationship between the social networks and labor market 
outcomes (see Jackson (2010) for a comprehensive survey). Economists have highlighted the 
role of the social ties in transmitting information on vacancies to unemployed individuals and 
in producing job referrals to the employers. For example, Granovetter (1995) argues that 
many people find their jobs through social relations, not only through formal channels. Social 
networks allow individuals gathering better information about the availability of jobs as well 
as the characteristics of the job when looking for work.  
 
5 
 
However, there is no consensus on the possible effects of social networks on subsequent 
wages. While Granovetter confirms the positive effects of social networks on incomes and 
quality of job matching, other studies have not found the differences in incomes between 
those who seek jobs from formal channels and those through social networks (such as Lin, 
1999; Mouwn, 2003; Franzen & Hangartner, 2006). In addition, one of the empirical 
challenges is that the network is not observed. Literature often approximates the social 
network by using information of particular groups which are known to be socially cohesive 
and clustered in certain areas (e.g., ethnic minority groups). However, these studies which use 
regression models to estimate the relationship between labor market outcomes and a proxy for 
the social network are likely to capture geographical or ethnic proximity of individuals rather 
than networks (Topa, 2001; Clark & Drinkwater, 2002; Munshi, 2003; Bayer, Ross & Topa, 
2008; Patacchini & Zenou, 2008).  
 
There are few studies that use direct measures of the network. Cappellari and Tatsiramos 
(2010) draw information on the employment status of one’s friends using the British 
Household Panel Survey. They find that transitions from unemployment into employment are 
positively correlated with the number of employed friends. Calvò-Armengol, Patacchini & 
Zenou (2009) create a network variable based on schoolmates using the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Adolescent Health. They find that an individual’s position in the network is 
strongly correlated with their school performance. Wahba & Zenou (2005), who use density 
of population to capture size of networks in Egypt, find that density is positively correlated 
with the probability of finding a job through the social networks. This is however happening 
up to a certain threshold, beyond which congestion effects exist and hence individuals in 
particularly dense areas are less likely to find a job through the social networks. Another 
study by Goel and Lang (2010) using data on recent arrivals to Canada find that the impact of 
obtaining jobs through the social networks on wages is decreasing on their measure of 
network strength.  Giulietti et al. (2010) use a direct measure of social networks, which is 
self-reported of migrants on the number of greetings that they make during the Lunar New 
Year to urban people, to explore the effect of social ties on wages. They find that employed 
migrants with a larger network can get better incomes. 
 
2.2. Institutional background 
 
Over the past decade, the internal migration in Vietnam has been increased rapidly. During 
the period 2004-2009, there are about 6.7 million individuals or 8.6 percent of the population 
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aged five and older in Vietnam who has changed their places of residence (General Statistics 
Office (GSO), 2011). This figure is much higher than the one in the previous period with only 
about 6.5 percent of people at or above five years old migrated (GSO & UNDP, 2001).  
 
However, Vietnam has not had any special policies focusing on internal migration. The role 
of internal migration in the policies of economic development has not been considered 
seriously. It partly stems from the fact that the issues of internal migrants are not under the 
jurisdiction of any specific government agencies. Only a few local provinces, such as the 
major cities that attract a large amount of migration, have a few policies to support and 
manage migrant workers (UNDP, 2010). Therefore, migrants are regarded as a vulnerable 
group.  
 
A significant portion of migration workers have unstable jobs, particularly in the informal 
sector. Their basic incomes often do not meet the minimum living needs. They also have to 
pay higher price for basic social services (Oxfarm, 2015). Residence Law in 2007 had some 
reforms but household registration (ho khau) is still a requirement to get an access to public 
services and benefit programs. This creates substantial inconveniences for migrants because 
they normally do not have permanent residence and therefore have difficulties in accessing 
those services (ActionAid Vietnam, 2012).  
 
3. Data Sources and Description 
 
Data used are from the Vietnam Rural Urban Migration Survey (VRUMS) 2013. The 
VRUMS is conducted by the Central Institute for Economic Management of the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment, Vietnam under the technical support from Research School of 
Economics at the Australian National University. The objective of VRUMS is to gather 
sample information on rural-urban migration in Vietnam anchoring to 2012 Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS2012). The survey intends to help to understand 
the effects of large scale rural-urban migration in the process of economic development and to 
assist the government in formulating the right economic and social policies to facilitate the 
rural-urban migration and urbanization process. 
 
The VRUMS collects information from 869 migrant households from rural areas of Vietnam 
to urban areas of Ha Noi and Hochiminh city and surrounding areas for work purpose. 
Migrant households are defined as households whether members must have family 
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relationship or relatives with migrants, live with migrants and share their incomes and 
expenditures at the time of interview. These households come from the rural households 
oberseved in the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 2012 (VHLSS2012) which is 
national representative survey undertaken biannually by the General Statistical Office of 
Vietnam (GSO).   
 
The survey are carried out in four rounds corresponding to four rounds of the VHLSS2012. It 
covers both the migrants who are currently and those who used to be members of rural 
households but are currently in Hanoi or Hochiminh city. It captures both long-term (over 6 
months) and short-term (6 months and shorter such as temporary and seasonal) migrants that 
have not been fully taken into account in other surveys. 
 
Another novelity of the survey is that it includes questions asking about both the current 
incomes and the first job incomes that allow me to investigate the income dynamics of 
migrants. The survey also includes comprehensive information on household and personal 
characteristics, detailed health status, employment, training and education of adults and 
children, social networks, family and social relationships, life events, and mental health 
measures of the individuals.  
 
To investigate the social network of migrants, I follow Giulietti et al. (2010) to take the 
number of phone calls to people living in urban areas that a migrant made during the Lunar 
New Year as a proxy for social networks. This information however is only provided by the 
respondent head of household, and hence only these individuals are included in the sample. 
The exact wording of the question is as follows: ‘During the last Lunar New Year, how many 
people in total did you send your greetings. Among them, ________person(s) is (are) 
currently living in the city’. 
 
To investigate the impact of social network on employment transition, I use information from 
the question asking about migrants who are currently wage earners and reported to be 
thinking to change to run their own business. The exact question is: ‘Have you ever thought 
of running a business of your own?’. Respondents could either answer never; never seriously 
because it would be very difficult or yes, they have. I construct a measure that takes on the 
binary value of 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to the response ‘Never’ and ‘Never seriously’ 
and 1 to the response ‘Yes, I have’. I then estimate a linear probability model. Another 
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strategy is to estimate a logit model. As I discuss below, the estimates are qualitatively 
identical if I pursue this alternative strategy. 
 
The summary statistics for migrant’s household heads are presented in Table 1. On average, 
migrants have about ten years of education and they have left home more than eight years 
before the survey. The percentage of female is quite small because only household head, 
usually males, are considered in the sample under scrutiny. Current jobs of migrants have 
been better paid than their first job in the cities. There are more than one-third of current 
wage earners are willing to change their job and run their own business. Regarding the 
network measure, each migrant has on average nearly twelve contacts in urban areas. The 
variable of switching in job types measures whether the migrants change from their formal 
jobs (that means with working contracts) to informal jobs (without working contract). This 
variable will take value of 1 when they change from informal to formal jobs and of – 1 if they 
change from one informal job to another one. The data shows that migrants tend to switch 
from informal to formal jobs. The duration of staying in the cities of migrants is on average 
more than seven years. This figure may be substantial higher than that in other migration 
surveys because VRUMS covers both short- and long-term migrants. 
 
4. Estimating equations and empirical results 
 
4.1 OLS estimates 
 
I begin by estimating the relationship between social network and employment dynamics 
using the following baseline model is: 
 
      
iciiiic ZXnetworkSocialY  
''_
                   
(1) 
 
where i indexes individual, c original community in rural regions. Yic denotes the two 
outcome measures: income dynamics and wage earners wanting to become self-employed. 
inetworkSocial _  represents the number of calls made to urban people during the Lunar New 
Year. β is the coefficient of interest as it indicates the relationship between the social network 
and change in the migrants’ outcomes. I expect β to be positive and statistically significant. 
ic is an exogenous labor demand shock, which reflects the idea that individual migrants from 
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given location could be endowed with specific skills that channel them into particular 
segments of the labor market even when networks are absent. 
 
The vector 
'
i  controls a set of individual-level covariates, which includes age, age squared, 
years of education, a gender indicator, a dummy variable for people who are ethnic minorities 
and dummies for being employed in state or foreign sectors. The vector 
'
i  consists of other 
variables, such as duration of staying in the cities and change in job types. 
 
Given that the main explanatory variable, inetworkSocial _ , in Equation 1 may have similar 
effects on people coming from the same sending commune in rural areas, in all regression 
below, I clustered the standard errors for a potentially arbitrary correlation between 
individuals in the same original commune in rural areas. 
 
Table 2 reports OLS estimates of the impacts of social networks on difference in migrant’s 
incomes between the current and first job incomes.  The income from the first job is adjusted 
for inflation to make the figures comparable across years because migrants arrived in the 
cities in various points of time. In Column 1, I estimate the relationship between the number 
of urban calls with migrant’s income dynamics. The estimates show that the number of urban 
calls has a positive impact on change in migrant’s incomes. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the social network positively affects individual’s incomes. At the same time, 
the coefficient is statistically significant. Realizing that there are some outliers, that may drive 
the results (see Figure 1), in Column 2, I exclude migrants with more than 100 calls. The 
effect of social networks is three times higher. The result indicates that one more contact on 
average is associated with nearly one percent increase in income change.  
 
Estimates of other variables are also consistent with the results from other studies and 
expectations. People working in the foreign sector have higher increase in incomes. While the 
age and age square variables both significantly influence change in wages at the 0.05 
significance level, the directions of the two effects are different. This implies a diminishing 
marginal effect of the age.  
 
Columns 3-5 of Table 2 report estimates of Equation 1 with the additional controls included. 
In Column 3, I control for duration of migrants in the cities. Network effects will depend on 
both their size and their duration, since migrants who have been in the cities longer are more 
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established and may have larger social networks. I also add the variables that measure the 
change in the job types of current and first job of migrants in the cities. I classify the jobs with 
contract as formal ones and code them as 1 and 0 otherwise. In the two last columns, I control 
for the interaction between the number of calls and different cohorts of duration of staying in 
the cities. The results indicate that the number of urban calls bring more benefits to more 
established migrants, especially to those who stay in the cities less than 3 years and from 5 to 
8 years. Based on the estimates from Column 4, the point estimate for this cohort implies that 
one more contact on average is associated with a 0.9 percent increase in income changes, 
which is equal to 10.6 per cent of the sample average for log of migrant’s current incomes.2  
 
OLS estimates examining the relationship between the number of urban calls and willingness 
to run their own business are reported in Table 33. The specification reported includes the 
similar control variables as in the income dynamics equation except I include log of current 
incomes which may affect the job decision of migrants. The estimates indicate a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between social networks and migrants’ willingness to run 
their own business by current wage earners except the last column. Nonetheless, the 
coefficient of the number of urban calls in the last column has the same sign and magnitude 
with that in the first column. An increase in standard errors may reflect a loss of precision 
arising from significant attrition of observations when I add more control variables.  
 
I also check for robustness to alternative estimation methods. Because the responses to 
willingness to own business question are restricted in range, they may not be normally 
distributed. To overcome this problem, I use a logit model instead. The results from the logit 
model in Appendix A.1 are qualitatively identical to our OLS estimates. The marginal effects 
are consistent with those estimated by OLS and statistically significant.   
 
4.2 Identifying the causal relationship 
 
To consistently estimate an OLS model, the explanatory variable of interest, the network 
size, should be uncorrelated with individual unobserved ability. This assumption, however, 
is very likely to be violated. These unobservable individual factors might be correlated 
with both incomes or willingness to run own business as well as the network size, leading 
                                                          
2The mean of log of migrant’s current income is 8.44. The effect is calculated as 0.9/8.44=0.106 or 10.6 per cent 
of mean. 
3
The main reason to use OLS rather other estimators such as logit is that the coefficients estimated by OLS are 
easier to be interpreted.  
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to biased and inconsistent estimates. The direction and magnitude of this bias depend on 
the partial correlation of the omitted variable with the error term. For example, if more 
productive individuals are more likely to have a larger network, then the estimates of β will 
be biased upward. In addition, the wages and the network size may be mutually determined, 
leading to the simultaneity bias. For example, high income in the cities may provide an 
incentive for migrants to expand their network directly and/or may encourage more 
friends and relatives to migrate, hence enlarging their network indirectly. Another source 
of potential endogeneity to income dynamics is related to the timing of the survey. 
Respondents are typically required to give information on characteristics of their network 
that is specific to the time of the survey, but not to the period when individuals searched or 
obtained their job. To the extent that the size of networks is affected by labor market 
events, the estimated coefficient will be biased. Another problem with Equation 1 is related 
to the measurement error of the network. This would affect size of network, and has to do 
with the imperfect recall and with the round numbers of contacts. Measurement error is 
expected to generate downward bias in the estimates.  
 
In this section, I try to assess whether the correlations documented to this point are causal by 
using an instrument for social networks. For the regression of interest, one would need to find 
an instrument which is correlated with network characteristics but have no direct impact on 
income dynamics or willingness to run own business
4
.
 
Origin characteristics that generate 
exogenous variation in the size of the migrant network, but are uncorrelated with labor 
demand shocks at the destination, could be valid instruments. I exploit the intensity of 
weather disasters in the original location of migrants as an instrument. Under certain 
assumptions, the weather disasters can be seen as an exogenous shock to the size of 
outflow migrants from the rural regions because the occurrence and destructive power of 
weather in a certain areas are random.  
 
There are numerous studies that found the relationship between migration behavior and 
natural disasters (see Belasen & Polachek (2011) for a review). The reasoning behind this 
result is also intuitive. For example, weather disasters would decrease the expected 
agricultural output of the households exposed  to  it,  and  thereby  encourage  members  of  
these  households  to  migrate. Consequently, being hit by natural hazards will trigger the 
outflow migration from rural regions. In other words, the higher the intensity of a natural 
disaster is, the more rural households are likely to move to urban areas.  
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Natural hazards are common in Vietnam. Rural households in Vietnam are exposed to 
many natural risks that could potentially threaten their livelihoods.  In addition, since the 
majority of households in rural areas rely on agricultural activities, they will experience 
fluctuations in agriculturally derived income from exogenous natural shocks such as 
drought, floods, pest infestation and livestock disease (CIEM, DOE, ILSSA & IPSARD 
2007). Here, I take rainfall variation as a proxy for the riskiness of natural environment. 
Literature indicates that the year-to-year rainfall variations capture the effects of 
hazardous natural environment such as floods, typhoons and storms in Vietnam 
reasonably well. For example, Benson (1997) shows that typhoons are typically 
associated with heavy rainfall and strong winds. Each typhoon accounts for about 10 to 
15 per cent, and sometimes even more, of annual rainfall and causes flash floods and 
landslides. In addition, heavy rainfall causes rivers to fill and potentially results in 
flooding. Therefore, I expect the more typhoons and storms or natural disaster in general 
a region suffers from, the more rainfall volatility it has. 
 
The data on rainfall variability are obtained from weather stations in 87 districts collected by 
the Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology.
4
 These stations are allocated to capture the best 
variation of weather within regions. For the districts without stations, the weather conditions 
are assumed to be similar to districts sharing the same borders with them but have a weather 
station. The reason for this strategy is that stations are expected to gauge significant weather 
disasters in the same geographic locations but different administrative regions. Therefore, 
weather data from one station could be used to measure neighboring districts with similar 
conditions.  
 
Monthly rainfall observations (from January to December) were available over 30 years for 
each station from 1975 to 2006. For each month, I calculated the standard deviation over the 
30 years for each station, and obtained the average rainfall deviation of each station over 12 
months to investigate year-to-year rainfall fluctuations. Specifically, consider rainfall variable 
x, station i, month m and year y, and deﬁne ximy as the value of x in station i in month m in 
year y. For each month m, I compute the standard deviation of ximy over all years (denoted sim), 
which measures the month-speciﬁc variability of variable x in station i. To obtain a compound 
measure of year-to-year variability for station i I average sim over the twelve months. 
                                                          
4
On average, there are nearly 12 districts in one province. The area of each district ranges from 27.8 to 3677.4 
square kilometres and the mean is 660 square kilometres. For the period 1975–2006, the data is taken from 
Thomas et al. ‘Natural disasters and household welfare: evidence from Vietnam’, Policy Research Working 
Paper, 2010, World Bank. 
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The reason to take weather disasters for a long time is twofold: (i) the migration data covers 
both long-term and short-term migrants with the longest duration of migrants in the cities 
about 48 years. Therefore, the reasons to migrate may originate from historical natural shocks 
rather than the present ones; (ii) long-term rainfall variation may closely relate with other bio-
geographic conditions such as land quality and terrain ruggedness. All of these can have both 
direct and indirect effects on agricultural incomes and living conditions or rural people that 
create incentives for migration.  
 
To be even more cautious about the exogeneity, the working assumptions are set up in such 
a way as to make the IV estimates as reasonable and cautious as possible: (i) Rainfall 
variation in the rural regions is assumed to not affect any labor market conditions at the 
destination; (ii) Unobserved individual heterogeneity such as ability, preferences and health 
conditions is assumed to be uncorrelated with the intensity of natural disasters. These 
assumptions are important to ensure that the relationship between social networks and 
outcome variables are indeed causal.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of the first stage IV estimates. Because the distribution of the 
weather disasters is highly left skewed, with a small number of observations taking large 
values, I report estimates using the natural log of the weather disasters measure. All the 
coefficients have the expected sign. The larger weather disasters are, the higher the number of 
urban calls is. All weather disasters coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
The F-test for an excluded instrument is also reported. The F-statistics in Table 4 range from 
5.72 to 9.47, suggesting that for some specifications there may be a potential concern about 
weak instruments. If a proposed instrument is not strongly correlated with the endogenous 
variables then the instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) estimates may be 
somewhat biased toward ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (Bound, Jaeger & Baker, 
1995; Staiger & Stock, 1997).  For this reason I also use the LIML Fuller Instrumental 
variable estimation method that is a bias-corrected limited information maximum likelihood 
estimator and provides the better estimates for inference purposes when the instrument is 
potentially weak (Stock, Wright & Yogo, 2002). The regression results in Appendix A.2 
provide similar estimates. 
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In the second stage, the estimated coefficients for social networks are significant and positive. 
The magnitude of the coefficient in the IV estimation does not change substantially if other 
controls are included, ranging from 0.072 to 0.089. The results in Column 4 of Table 5 show 
that the result is still significant when all other variables are controlled. The magnitude of the 
IV estimates is higher than those from the OLS estimates. One explanation for this is that the 
attenuation bias, resulting from measurement errors, leads OLS estimates to be biased towards 
zero, and IV results in an increase in the magnitude of the coefficient.  
 
In addition, because the IV estimate mainly applies to the subgroup of individuals more 
affected by natural disasters, the IV estimate can be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment 
Effects (LATE) (Imbens & Angrist, 1994). If the IV estimate is to be interpreted as a class of 
LATE, we must raise the question about the mechanism that explains how natural disasters 
influence migration and why networks effects differ across individuals. One possible 
mechanism is that that less able people (in terms of earning ability at the destination) are more 
responsive to natural disasters since they have relatively lower ability to compensate for 
losses due to natural disasters. That is, people of lower earning ability are more likely to leave 
the rural regions due to natural hazards. If this is the case, the IV estimate can be interpreted 
as a weighted average network effect and the weight for less able migrants is relatively 
higher. 
 
The IV results for the impacts of social network on willingness to run their own business by 
wage-earners are also consistent with the expectation. In Table 7, the result shows that one 
more contacts on average increases the probability of being become self-employed by around 
0.04.  In addition, all estimated coefficients for social network are significant, indicating that 
an increase in social network makes wage earners to be more willing to run their own 
business. 
 
Sensitivity tests 
 
The IV strategy employed in this paper rests on the assumptions that the weather disasters do 
not affect labor demand at destination and migrant’s earning ability and preferences. The first 
assumption is likely to be satisfied. I have not found any literature that documents that 
weather disasters may create a mass migration from rural regions that have big impacts on 
labor market condition in the cities over the last 30 years. However, the second assumption 
may be violated. Some studies, such as Durante (2009); Dang (2012); Cameron (2015), show 
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that natural disasters may change individual behaviors. They find that people who live in 
places with higher frequency of natural disasters trust other people more. In addition, they 
tend to be more risk averse. If trustworthiness and risk attitudes correlate with migrant’s 
incomes then the IV estimates will be biased and inconsistent. Natural conditions also may 
affect health conditions of migrants. To test all of these possibilities, I control for several 
variables including individual trust, risk preferences and health conditions. The results show 
that the results are almost identical (see Column 2 and 3, Table 5). 
 
Another way to test this likelihood is to estimate the reduced form relationship between 
weather disasters and migrant’s incomes. The estimation results are reported in Table 8. 
When I examine the reduced form, I find a strong positive and highly significant relationship 
between weather disasters and change in migrant’s incomes. This correlation is consistent 
with the first-and-second stage IV estimates in Tables 4 and 5, individuals who migrate from 
more weather disaster regions tend to have more extensive social networks and this in turn 
help them find better jobs with higher incomes.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite the proliferation of research seeking to identify the mechanisms and measure the 
magnitude of internal migration, little emphasis has been placed on probing the direct 
causal effects of migrant networks on labor market outcomes at the destination. This paper 
explores the causal effects of the size of migrant networks on income and employment 
dynamics among migrants in Vietnam’s major cities. It complements recent research on the 
effects of migrant networks on labor markets in other developing economies.  
 
Controlling for the unobserved factors influencing migration decision, identification is 
achieved through instrumenting the network size by the intensity of weather disasters 
occurring in the sending commune of the migrants. The empirical results show that the size 
of the migrant network significantly improves the incomes of migrants and makes wage 
earners more willing to run their own business. 
 
The results of this paper suggest that social networks help overcoming some of the frictions 
present in the labor market. On possible channel is that the social network helps to reduce 
the asymmetric information between the employer and the employee, therefore improving 
the job match. The results also show that although there is a stronger formalization of job 
16 
 
search channels in developing countries, for rural-urban migrants, personal contacts will 
still remain an important channel to obtain better paid jobs. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Log of change in current and 
first job incomes 
560 0.59 0.96 -4.94 6.42 
Thought about running their 
own business 
511 0.35 
 
0 1 
Switching from informal to 
formal job types 555 0.11 0.48 -1 1 
Years of schooling 546 9.66 2.95 0 12 
Age 560 29.67 8.28 16 66 
Gender 560 0.69 
 
0 1 
Minority 560 0.03 
 
0 1 
Working in state sector 559 0.12 
 
0 1 
Working in foreign sector 559 0.19 
 
0 1 
Number of urban calls made 485 11.53 20.82 0 270 
Duration of staying in the 
cities 
558 7.1 5.2 0.2 35 
Most people can be trusted 540 0.13 
 
0 1 
Level of risk preferences 540 5.25 1.79 0 10 
Health condition of migrants 560 0.95 
 
0 1 
 
21 
 
Table 2. OLS Estimates. Relationship between number of urban calls and income 
dynamics 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Log of change in current and first job incomes 
            
Number of calls to urban 
people 0.003* 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** -0.010 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Years of schooling -0.009 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Age 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.083** 0.082** 0.075** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.089 -0.077 -0.071 -0.054 -0.054 
 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.098) (0.100) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -0.377*** -0.393*** -0.401*** -0.377*** -0.395*** 
 
(0.133) (0.134) (0.140) (0.140) (0.152) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.118 -0.114 -0.105 -0.113 -0.136 
 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) (0.116) 
Foreign ownership:=1; o/w:=0 0.124 0.135 0.135 0.115 0.135 
 
(0.136) (0.137) (0.139) (0.142) (0.139) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
  
0.017 0.016 0.006 
   
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) 
Switching from informal to 
formal job types 
   
0.107 0.088 
    
(0.094) (0.096) 
Number of urban calls X Less 
than 3 years staying in the cities 
    
0.019** 
     
(0.007) 
Number of urban calls X From 3 
to less than 5 years staying in 
the cities 
    
0.015 
     
(0.011) 
Number of urban calls X From 5 
to less than 8 years staying in 
the cities 
    
0.028** 
     
(0.012) 
Number of urban calls X From 8 
to less than 12 years staying in 
the cities 
    
0.023 
     
(0.014) 
Constant -0.994** -0.928* -0.584 -0.608 -0.417 
 
(0.478) (0.473) (0.544) (0.546) (0.515) 
      Observations 470 466 465 461 461 
R-squared 0.047 0.053 0.060 0.061 0.074 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 3. OLS Estimates. Relationship between number of urban calls and employment 
transition 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Wage earners want to run a business 
            
Number of calls to urban 
people 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.004* 0.006 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Years of schooling 0.098** 0.099** 0.130*** 0.103** 0.100** 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) 
Age 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age squared 0.039*** 0.025** 0.025* 0.020 0.021 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 0.148 0.155 -0.013 -0.003 -0.012 
 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.127) (0.129) (0.127) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.025 -0.039 -0.011 -0.041 -0.035 
 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Foreign ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.009 -0.015 -0.043 -0.056 -0.061 
 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.007 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Switching from informal to 
formal job types 
  
0.058 0.045 0.046 
   
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
Log of total income per month 
   
0.159*** 0.161*** 
    
(0.055) (0.055) 
Number of urban calls X Less 
than 3 years staying in the cities 
    
-0.004 
     
(0.006) 
Number of urban calls X From 3 
to less than 5 years staying in 
the cities 
    
-0.002 
     
(0.005) 
Number of urban calls X From 5 
to less than 8 years staying in 
the cities 
    
-0.004 
     
(0.006) 
Number of urban calls X From 8 
to less than 12 years staying in 
the cities 
    
-0.000 
     
(0.007) 
Constant -0.500** -0.274 -0.276 -1.416*** -1.450*** 
 
(0.196) (0.209) (0.230) (0.462) (0.469) 
      Observations 607 604 504 502 502 
R-squared 0.052 0.070 0.081 0.095 0.096 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
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Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
 
Table 4. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban calls on income dynamics (First 
Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Number of calls to urban people 
         
Log of rainfall variation 7.630*** 6.825*** 6.078** 6.078** 
 
(2.479) (2.452) (2.537) (2.540) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.842 -0.678 -1.275 -1.264 
 
(1.144) (1.212) (1.284) (1.288) 
Age 0.652** 0.178 0.145 0.150 
 
(0.299) (0.327) (0.352) (0.348) 
Age squared -0.009** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 1.840 1.547 1.184 1.119 
 
(3.810) (3.477) (3.554) (3.484) 
Years of schooling 0.949*** 0.863*** 0.861*** 0.860*** 
 
(0.144) (0.146) (0.148) (0.148) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
0.548 0.915 0.987 
  
(1.971) (2.004) (2.005) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.567 -0.835 -0.767 
  
(1.230) (1.294) (1.295) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.288** 0.263** 0.265** 
  
(0.111) (0.125) (0.125) 
Level of risk preferences 
  
0.588* 0.594* 
   
(0.350) (0.352) 
Most people can be trusted:=1 
  
1.905 1.928 
   
(1.529) (1.528) 
Health condition of migrants 
  
 -0.928 
   
 (2.236) 
Constant -55.309*** -42.789*** -40.463** -39.690** 
 
(15.633) (15.858) (16.284) (16.309) 
   
 
 Observations 467 465 447 447 
F-test for excluded instrument 9.47 9.06 5.74 5.72 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two 
sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 5. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban calls on income dynamics (Second 
Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log of change in current and first job incomes 
         
Number of calls to urban people 0.072** 0.077** 0.089* 0.089* 
 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.034 -0.017 0.065 0.064 
 
(0.120) (0.128) (0.151) (0.151) 
Age 0.067 0.071* 0.068 0.067 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age squared -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -0.460 -0.488 -0.553 -0.543 
 
(0.287) (0.305) (0.361) (0.355) 
Years of schooling -0.077** -0.076** -0.095** -0.095** 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.289 -0.379 -0.390* 
  
(0.215) (0.232) (0.235) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.098 -0.167 -0.177 
  
(0.164) (0.163) (0.164) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
-0.005 0.013 0.012 
  
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
Level of risk preferences 
  
-0.039 -0.040 
   
(0.050) (0.050) 
Most people can be trusted:=1 
  
0.007 0.004 
   
(0.202) (0.203) 
Health condition of migrants 
  
 0.133 
   
 (0.266) 
Constant -0.273 -0.299 0.011 -0.100 
 
(0.678) (0.730) (0.748) (0.772) 
   
 
 Observations 467 465 447 447 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a 
two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 6. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban calls on employment transition 
(First Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Number of calls to urban people 
        
Log of rainfall variation 8.911*** 9.162*** 8.775*** 
 
(1.994) (2.092) (2.100) 
Years of schooling 0.775*** 0.666*** 0.693*** 
 
(0.123) (0.129) (0.131) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.569 -1.124 -1.116 
 
(0.979) (0.972) (0.970) 
Age 0.592** 0.279 0.270 
 
(0.259) (0.299) (0.301) 
Age squared -0.008** -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -2.424 -2.247 -2.388 
 
(2.172) (2.120) (2.148) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 0.882 0.677 0.808 
 
(1.814) (1.922) (1.924) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.762 -1.029 -1.043 
 
(0.961) (1.020) (1.021) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.201** 0.207** 
  
(0.086) (0.086) 
Level of risk preferences 
 
0.238 0.227 
  
(0.252) (0.253) 
Almost people can be trusted:=1 
  
1.679 
   
(1.188) 
Constant -59.772*** -56.493*** -54.509*** 
 
(13.061) (13.615) (13.641) 
    Observations 607 568 568 
F-test for excluded instrument 19.98 19.17 17.47 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 7. IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban calls on employment transition 
(Second Stage) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Wage-earners want to run a business 
        
Number of calls to urban people 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Years of schooling -0.022* -0.020 -0.017 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 0.125** 0.146** 0.144** 
 
(0.057) (0.059) (0.058) 
Age 0.015 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 0.249* 0.225* 0.214 
 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.046 -0.085 -0.077 
 
(0.093) (0.094) (0.092) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 0.043 0.018 0.015 
 
(0.060) (0.063) (0.062) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.007 0.007 
  
(0.006) (0.006) 
Level of risk preferences 
 
0.009 0.009 
  
(0.015) (0.014) 
Most people can be trusted:=1 
  
0.080 
   
(0.085) 
Constant -0.243 -0.227 -0.246 
 
(0.278) (0.286) (0.281) 
    Observations 607 568 568 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table 8. Reduced form. Relationship between weather disasters and migrant’s incomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log of change in current and first job incomes 
         
Log of rainfall variation 0.549** 0.526** 0.540** 0.540** 
 
(0.261) (0.250) (0.266) (0.266) 
Years of schooling -0.008 -0.009 -0.018 -0.018 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age 0.114*** 0.085** 0.081** 0.081** 
 
(0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.094 -0.070 -0.048 -0.049 
 
(0.091) (0.096) (0.094) (0.094) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -0.328*** -0.369*** -0.447*** -0.444*** 
 
(0.124) (0.128) (0.129) (0.130) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.246 -0.298* -0.302* 
  
(0.161) (0.153) (0.155) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.142 -0.242** -0.245** 
  
(0.139) (0.117) (0.119) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
 
0.018 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  
(0.021) (0.013) (0.013) 
Level of risk preferences 
  
0.013 0.013 
   
(0.025) (0.025) 
Most people can be trusted:=1 
  
0.176 0.175 
   
(0.113) (0.114) 
Health condition of migrants 
  
 0.051 
   
 (0.168) 
Constant -4.252*** -3.596** -3.584** -3.627** 
 
(1.621) (1.476) (1.581) (1.600) 
   
 
 Observations 467 465 447 447 
R-squared 0.048 0.060 0.108 0.108 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
Clustered standard errors are in brackets.
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Figure 1. Relationship between income dynamics and number of urban calls 
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Appendix    
 
A.1 Logistic regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Wage-earners want to run a business 
          
Number of calls to urban people 0.017** 0.014* 0.033* 0.024 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.021) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 0.500** 0.378* 0.371 0.531** 
 
(0.219) (0.227) (0.228) (0.249) 
Years of schooling 0.034 0.003 0.004 0.009 
 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age 0.206** 0.169* 0.182* 0.167* 
 
(0.103) (0.099) (0.101) (0.099) 
Age squared -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 0.716 0.795 0.742 -0.079 
 
(0.533) (0.543) (0.549) (0.680) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.174 -0.313 -0.260 -0.143 
 
(0.265) (0.274) (0.278) (0.299) 
Foreign ownership:=1; o/w:=0 -0.085 -0.143 -0.169 -0.297 
 
(0.254) (0.257) (0.260) (0.273) 
Duration of staying in the cities 0.055*** 0.041** 0.033 0.039* 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) 
Log of total income per month 
 
0.779*** 0.810*** 0.790*** 
  
(0.250) (0.256) (0.286) 
Switching from informal to formal job types 
   
0.249 
    
(0.229) 
Number of urban calls X Less than 3 years 
staying in the cities 
  
-0.009 0.005 
   
(0.027) (0.030) 
Number of urban calls X From 3 to less than 
5 years staying in the cities 
  
-0.022 -0.013 
   
(0.025) (0.028) 
Number of urban calls X From 5 to less than 
8 years staying in the cities 
  
-0.021 -0.017 
   
(0.020) (0.023) 
Number of urban calls X From 8 to less than 
12 years staying in the cities 
  
-0.028 -0.017 
   
(0.020) (0.024) 
Constant -4.89*** -10.32*** -10.74*** -10.40*** 
 
(1.603) (2.368) (2.446) (2.635) 
     Observations 605 601 601 503 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  
Clustered standard errors are in brackets.  
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A.2. LIML Fuller IV Estimates. Impacts of number of urban calls on income dynamics  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log of change in current and first job incomes 
         
Number of calls to urban people 0.072** 0.074** 0.089* 0.089* 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.047) (0.047) 
Male:=1; w/o:=0 -0.034 -0.024 0.065 0.064 
 
(0.120) (0.125) (0.151) (0.151) 
Age 0.067 0.065 0.068 0.067 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) 
Age squared -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Minority:=1; w/o:=0 -0.460 -0.482 -0.553 -0.543 
 
(0.287) (0.299) (0.361) (0.355) 
Years of schooling -0.077** -0.075** -0.095** -0.095** 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) 
State ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.282 -0.379 -0.390* 
  
(0.213) (0.232) (0.235) 
Private ownership:=1; o/w:=0 
 
-0.106 -0.167 -0.177 
  
(0.161) (0.163) (0.164) 
Duration of staying in the cities 
  
0.013 0.012 
   
(0.021) (0.021) 
Level of risk preferences 
  
-0.039 -0.040 
   
(0.050) (0.050) 
Most people can be trusted:=1 
  
0.007 0.004 
   
(0.202) (0.203) 
Health condition of migrants 
  
 0.133 
   
 (0.266) 
Constant -0.273 -0.191 0.011 -0.100 
 
(0.678) (0.714) (0.748) (0.772) 
   
 
 Observations 467 466 447 447 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a 
two sided alternative.  Clustered standard errors are in brackets. 
 
